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This synopsis of developments in the field of immigration law
focuses on the areas of the law in which there were significant
changes from October, 1980 through September, 1981. The discus-
sion includes important judicial decisions, significant administra-
tive actions taken by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and a sum-
mary of proposed legislation. The synopsis should serve as a
guide to further research in the immigration laws of the United
States.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
During the 1980-1981 term, the Supreme Court decided three
cases' in the area of immigration law and granted certiorari in
two others.2 The Court noted probable jurisdiction in two cases 3
1. INS v. Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), rev'g 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980);
Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), affg 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), rev'g 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1979).
2. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), cert granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3211
(U.S. October 6, 1981) (80-1832). See notes 197-213 infra and accompanying text.
Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 620 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 449 U.S. 945 (1981).
In addition to granting certiorari, the Court vacated the lower court decision and
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration. See notes 118-
131 infra and accompanying text.
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which it consolidated. In addition, the Court denied review in
thirteen other significant cases in various areas of immigration
law.4
Fedorenko v. United States
Fedorenko v. United States,5 involved an alien who failed to dis-
close in his application for a United States visa that he had served
as a concentration camp guard. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held
that this failure to disclose rendered his citizenship revocable as
"illegally procured." Furthermore, the Court held that a district
court lacks equitable discretion to refrain from entering a judg-
ment of denaturalization against a naturalized citizen whose citi-
zenship was procured illegally.
Fedorenko was admitted to the United States in 1949 under the
Displaced Persons Act (DPA).6 His visa, issued under the Act,
was based on an application which concealed the fact that he was
a concentration camp guard during the Second World War.7 Fol-
lowing his admission, Fedorenko led a law-abiding life as a fac-
tory worker. When he applied for naturalization in 1969, he did
not disclose his service as a concentration camp guard.
Fedorenko's petition for naturalization was granted and he be-
came an American citizen in 1970.8 Seven years later the Govern-
ment brought an action in the United States District Court to
revoke Fedorenko's citizenship. The Government alleged that he
had willfully misrepresented information about his service as an
armed guard in his applications for a DPA visa and for citizen-
ship. Therefore, Fedorenko had procured his naturalization ile-
gally or by willfully misrepresenting material facts.9
The district court heldO that Fedorenko had not made a "mate-
rial misrepresentation" as defined by the Supreme Court in
Chaunt v. United States." In Chaunt, the Supreme Court held
that a misrepresentation was material only if it was shown "either
3. In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
prob. juris noted sub nom. Texas v. Certain Children, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981); Doe v.
Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), prob. juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
4. For a summary of the 13 circuit court decisions which were denied review,
and the 15 decisions for which petitions are pending, see 58 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 440.44 (1981).
5. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
6. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948).
7. 449 U.S. at 496.
8. Id. at 497.
9. Id. at 497-98.
10. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597 F.2d
946 (5th Cir. 1979), affid, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
11. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
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(1) that facts suppressed which, if known, would have warranted
denial of citizenship or (2) that their disclosure might have been
useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of
other facts warranting denial of citizenship."'12 Furthermore, the
district court ruled in Fedorenko that even if the misrepresenta-
tions were material, "equitable and mitigating circumstances"' 3
required that he be allowed to retain his citizenship.14 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Chaunt test of
"materiality" had been satisfied' 5 and that the district court lack-
ed the authority to excuse "the fraudulent procurement of citizen-
ship"16 under the denaturalization statute.17
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Fifth Circuit, but
it disagreed with both of the lower courts on the applicability of
the Chaunt materiality test.18 Chaunt involved willfull misrepre-
sentations made in citizenship applications. 19 In Fedorenko the
misrepresentation was contained in the petitioner's visa applica-
tion.20 The Court held that the materiality of a misrepresentation
in a visa application must be measured in terms of its effect on
the admissibility of the applicant into the country. At the very
least, a false statement is material if disclosure of the truth would
render the applicant ineligible for a visa.21 The Court concluded,
as a matter of law, that disclosure of the true facts about
Fedorenko's past history would have made him ineligible for a
visa under the DPA.22 The Court rejected the district court's de-
termination that section 2(a) of the DPA23 excluded only those
12. Id. at 355.
13. 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978). The circumstances the District Court
pointed to as equitable and mitigating were: (1) the inconclusive nature of the ev-
idence that Fedorenko had committed any war crimes while a concentration camp
guard, and (2) the uncontroverted evidence that he had led a law-abiding and re-
sponsible life since coming to the U.S. Id. at 920-21.
14. Id.
15. 597 F.2d at 951.
16. Id. at 954.
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976).
18. 449 U.S. at 508.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 509.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 514.
23. The DPA § 2, 62 Stat 1009, incorporated the definition of "refugees or dis-
placed persons" contained in Annex I to the Constitution of the International Ref-
ugee Organization of the United Nations (IRO). 62 Stat. 3037-3055 (1946). The IRO
Constitution was ratified by the United States and provided that the following per-
sons would not be eligible for refugee or displaced person status:
persons who voluntarily assisted in the persecution of civilians. 24
The conclusion that Fedorenko was ineligible for a DPA visa al-
lowed the Court to decide the case on statutory grounds.25 With-
out a valid immigrant visa, Fedorenko could not have legally
obtained permanent residence,2 6 which is a prerequisite to citi-
zenship.27 Because Fedorenko failed to comply with the statutory
prerequisites, his certificate of citizenship was revocable as "ille-
gally procured."2 8
The Court also rejected the argument that a district court in a
denaturalization proceeding has discretion to weigh the equities
in determining whether citizenship should be revoked.2 9 The
Court agreed with the petitioner that a denaturalization is a suit
in equity.3 0 Nevertheless, the Court held that once a district court
determines that citizenship has been illegally procured, that court
has no discretion to avoid the statutory mandate of Congress.31
United States v. Cortez
In United States v. Cortez,32 the Supreme Court reversed a
Ninth Circuit decision that overturned the convictions of two indi-
1. War criminals, quislings and traitors.
2. Any other person who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of
countries, Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of
the second world war in their operations against the United Nations.
IRO Constitution, Annex L Part II, 62 Stat. 3051-3052 (1946).
24. 449 U.S. at 512. The Court observed that had Congress felt a "voluntari-
ness" requirement was necessary in § 2(a), it could have included one as it did in
§ 2(b), which excludes from eligibility for a DPA visa only those who "voluntarily
assisted the enemy forces ... in their operations. . . ." See note 23 supra.
25. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a), 1429, 1451 (1976).
26. At the time Fedorenko entered the United States in 1949, § 13(a) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 161 provided that "[N]o
immigrant shall be admitted to the United States unless he (i) has an unexpired
immigration visa .... " Although the 1924 Act was repealed in 1952, the same re-
quirement is now contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1181(a) (1976).
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1429 (1976) states: "[N]o person shall be naturalized unless he
has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in ac-
cordance with all applicable provisions of this Act." See ayso 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)
(1976).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part-
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys ... to institute pro-
ceedings ... for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order ad-
mitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of
naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturaliza-
tion were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a mate-
rial fact or by willful misrepresentation....
29. 449 U.S. at 517.
30. Id. at 516.
31. Id. at 517.
32. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
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viduals for knowingly transporting illegal aliens in violation of
section 274(a) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).33
The convictions were based on evidence produced from a vehicle
stop which the Ninth Circuit found to be solely the product of a
"proffie" and therefore illegal.34
The decision to stop the Cortez vehicle was based in part on the
Border Patrol officers' objective observations and in part on the
inferences which the officers drew from those observations. 35 Al-
though the Ninth Circuit felt that the stop was the result of too
many "innocent inferences, '3 6 the Supreme Court disagreed. The
Court noted that the Fourth Amendment predicate for a brief in-
vestigatory stop, as outlined in Terry v. Ohio,37 is a reasonable
suspicion that the particular person stopped is engaged in wrong-
doing. The existence of a reasonable suspicion is determined by
taking into account the totality of the circumstances. 38
The Court stressed the training and experience of the detaining
officers.3 9 Trained law enforcement officers can combine objective
facts, meaningless to the layman, with permissible inferences and
deductions from those facts, to form a legitimate, particularized
and objective suspicion that an individual is engaged in criminal
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2) (1976).
34. United States v. Cortez, 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 411
(1981).
35. Based on their observations of distinctive footprints in the desert and on
their knowledge of alien-smuggling patterns in the area, the officers deduced that
someone was leading groups of 8 to 20 persons from the Mexican border to an iso-
lated point 30 miles north on an east-west highway. From their discovery of simi-
lar footprints in the same area over a period of time, the officers surmised that the
smuggling operation generally occurred on clear weekend nights between 2 a.m.
and 6 a.m. The officers also observed that when the groups came within 75 yards
of the highway, they turned and walked eastward, parallel to the road. This pat-
tern led the officers to conclude that a pick-up vehicle would approach from the
east, and that after the pick up, it would return to the east.
On the night that the officers had deduced the operation would next occur, they
positioned themselves along the highway about 30 miles east of the suspected
pick-up point. During a five hour surveillance, only two vehicles suitable for smug-
gling sizable groups of aliens passed the officers heading west. One of these vehi-
cles passed by the officers again, heading east, within the time calculated by the
officers for making a round trip to the pickup point. The officers stopped the vehi-
cle, which was driven by Cortez, and noted that the shoe prints of the passenger
matched the footprints they had observed in the desert. 449 U.S. at 413-16.
36. 595 F.2d at 508.
37. 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968).
38. 449 U.S. at 417.
39. Id. at 418.
activity.4 0 As a result, the Court held that the officers could rea-
sonably conclude that the particular vehicle they stopped was en-
gaged in wrongdoing.4 1 The Court also noted the demands of
patrolling the border and halting the flow of illegal entrants.
INS v. Wang
The Court decided INS v. Wang42 in a per curiam opinion. The
Wangs had entered the United States in 1970 as nonimmigrants,
and remained beyond the authorized date of their visas without
permission. After being found deportable in 1974, they applied
for, but were denied, adjustment of status under section 245 of the
INA.43 The Wangs' appeal of this ruling was dismissed in 1977 by
the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Wangs then filed a mo-
tion to reopen the proceedings under section 244 of the Act, which
provides for suspension of deportation where deportation would
result in "extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent
or child .... "44 The Wangs claimed their two American-born
children would suffer educational and economic hardship if the
family was deported.45
The BIA refused the Wangs' motion, without remanding for a
hearing, on the basis that a mere showing of economic detriment
does not establish a prima facie case of extreme hardship, and
that the loss of educational opportunities to the children did not
in itself constitute extreme hardship.46 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the BIA, and remanded the
case for a hearing on the merits.47 The Ninth Circuit found that
for the purposes of section 244, extreme hardship could be shown
by evidence that the hardship caused by deportation would be
"different and more severe" than is ordinarily suffered.4 8
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred on pro-
cedural and substantive points. First, by ordering a hearing on
the Wangs' motion, the court of appeals circumvented the regula-
tion,49 which requires applicants for suspension to support by affi-
40. Id. at 419.
41. Id. at 421-22.
42. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976). See notes 264-278 infra and accompanying text.
44. Id. § 1254. The spouse, parent or child must be a United States citizen or a
lawfully admitted permanent resident. See notes 214-233 infra and accompanying
text.
45. 450 U.S. at 142.
46. Id. at 142-43.
47. Wang v. INS, 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd per curiam, 450 U.S. 139
(1981).
48. 622 F.2d at 1346.
49. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8 (1981) provides in part: "Motions to reopen shall state the
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davit or other evidentiary material the particular facts which the
alien claims constitute extreme hardship. The Wangs' allegations
were conclusory and unsupported by affidavit, and thus failed to
comply with these procedural requirements.50 Second, the Court
noted that the determination of what constitutes "extreme hard-
ship" is committed by the INA to the Attorney General and his
delegates.51 The immigration judge below, by finding that neither
the Wangs nor their children would suffer extreme hardship as a
result of deportation, was acting within his authority. Therefore,
the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred by encroaching on the
authority of the Attorney General and his delegates. 52 Further-
more, the Court observed that the Attorney General and his dele-
gates have the authority, consistent with the exceptional nature
of the suspension remedy, to adopt a narrow construction of "ex-
treme hardship". The minimal standard of the Ninth Circuit
would be unfair to those awaiting a visa 53 and would result in a
transfer of the administration of hardship cases from the INS to
the court of appeals.54
The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in two
cases which it has consolidated for decision in the next term.55 In
re Alien Children Education LitigationS6 and Doe v. Plyler,5 7 raise
serious questions about the constitutional rights of undocu-
mented aliens, and the lower court opinions will be discussed be-
low.58 In addition the Court has granted certiorari in INS v.
new facts to be proved at the reopened hearing and shall be supported by affida-
vits or other evidentiary material."
50. 450 U.S. at 143.
51. Id. at 144. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976) places the determination of whether de-
portation would result in extreme hardship "in the opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral .... "
52. 450 U.S. at 144.
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(d) (1976) provides upon suspension that "unless the alien
is an immediate relative within the meaning of section 201(b) the Secretary of
State shall reduce by one the number of nonpreference immigrant visas author-
ized to be issued under section 203(a) (7) for the fiscal year then current."
54. 450 U.S. at 145-46.
55. In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
prob. juris noted sub nom. Texas v. Certain Children, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981); Doe v.
Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), prob. juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
56. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
57. 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), prob. juris noted sub nom. Texas v. Cer-
tain Children, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
58. See notes 61-93 infra and accompanying text.
Chadha.59 In Chadha, the Ninth Circuit struck down as unconsti-
tutional the statutory mechanism by which one house of Con-
gress can veto the Attorney General's decision to suspend
deportation.60
EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS
In two recently decided cases, courts have held that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment extends to aliens
illegally within the United States.6' Both decisions enjoined en-
forcement of section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code,62 which
prohibited the use of state funds to educate children who were
neither citizens nor legally admitted aliens.
In Doe v. Plyler,63 the Fifth Circuit held that the statute as ap-
plied violated the equal protection clause. A local school district
had implemented the policy of section 21.031 by charging $1,000
tuition per year for each child unable to document the legality of
his or her presence.64 The lower court ruled in favor of the class
of all undocumented school-age children of Mexican origin resid-
ing within the district. The court enjoined the trustees of the
school district from applying section 21.031 so as to deny free edu-
cation to any child on the basis of his or her status as an undocu-
mented Mexican alien.65
The Fifth Circuit began by analyzing the applicability of the
equal protection clause to undocumented aliens. First, the court
noted that fourteenth amendment due process protections extend
to undocumented aliens.66 Second, documented aliens residing in
the United States are entitled to the equal protection of the laws
as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.67 Third, the court
observed that the fourteenth amendment prohibits the states
from enacting laws that deny equal protection to "any person
within its jurisdiction."68 The court thought it clear that undocu-
mented aliens are "persons within the territorial jurisdiction" of
59. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3211 (U.S. October 6,
1981) (80-1832).
60. See notes 197-213 infra and accompanying text.
61. In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980),
prob. juris. noted sub nom. Texas v. Certain Children, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981); Doe v.
Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), prob. juriy. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
62. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
63. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 2044 (1981).
64. 628 F.2d at 450.
65. 458 F. Supp. 569, 593 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
66. 628 F.2d at 454. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206 (1953).
67. 628 F.2d at 454. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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the state in which they reside.69 Fourth, the Supreme Court in
Wong Wing v. United States70 indicated that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment does extend to undocu-
mented aliens.71 Finally, the Fifth Circuit felt that logic com-
pelled the conclusion that the fourteenth amendment was
intended to afford undocumented aliens equal protection of the
laws.72 If this constitutional mandate were not available to un-
documented aliens, there would be nothing to invalidate a state
statute which set a penalty for a crime committed by an undocu-
mented alien at several times the level of the penalty assessed
against a citizen or legal alien for committing the identical
crime.73
In determining that section 21.031 as applied was unconstitu-
tional, the Fifth Circuit did not decide whether strict scrutiny
would be the appropriate standard of review.74 Although the
court discussed several reasons for adopting a stringent test,75 it
concluded that the statute failed to satisfy even the less strict ra-
tional basis standard.76
The State argued that section 21.031 as applied through the dis-
trict tuition policy was necessary to preserve the rights of citizens
and lawful permanent residents to an adequate free education.
The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the court
observed that the inclusion of illegal aliens in free public educa-
tion would not absolutely deprive anyone of a free education and
would at most result in a decline in the quality of education for all
students.77 Such a decline does not give rise to a constitutional
claim,78 and therefore adequate free education is not a right but a
state-provided benefit.79 Second, the court felt that a state's de-
sire to save money could not justify totally excluding from public
69. 628 F.2d at 454.
70. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
71. 628 F.2d at 455.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 456 n.20.
74. Id. at 458.
75. The court addressed, but did not answer, whether the complete depriva-
tion of free education amounts to a denial of a fundamental right. The court also
noted that the characteristics of the group of excluded undocumented children
might be such that suspect status would be proper. Id. at 457-58.
76. Id. at 458.
77. Id. at 459.
78. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
79. 628 F.2d at 459.
education children who share similar characteristics with chil-
dren who were not excluded.80 The State argued that the ex-
cluded children did not share the characteristic of legal presence
with the included children. The court noted that this would be a
strong point but for the fact that the undocumented children are
entitled to equal protection of the law. Therefore, the State may
not justify the classification on a mere desire to discriminate. 81
The court also rejected the argument that denial of a free edu-
cation would lessen the incentive to enter the United States ile-
gaily.8 2 The court noted that the number of undocumented aliens
who bring their children to the United States is a small percent-
age of the total number of undocumented aliens in the country.
Thus, section 21.031 only dealt with a small part of the problem.
In light of the district court's finding that section 21.031 was inef-
fective in discouraging illegal immigration, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the statute was not rationally related to that goal.83
In re Alien Children Education Litigation84 also involved sec-
tion 21.031. The decision of the district court, which the Fifth Cir-
cuit summarily affirmed, 85 held that the statute was
unconstitutional on its face. The lower court enjoined Texas from
denying free public education to any child based on the child's
immigration status.8 6
The district court ruled that the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause applied to undocumented aliens. The court re-
lied on the factors discussed in Doe v. Plyler,87 and also noted
that other federal courts have held that the equal protection
clause protected undocumented aliens.8 8
The court felt that a fundamental right, access to education, was
effectively denied by the statute.89 The State did not meet the
80. Id.
81. Id. at 460.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 461.
84. 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Texas v. Cer-
tain Children, 101 S. Ct. 3078 (1981).
85. 49 U.S.L.W. 3919 (U.S. June 9, 1981) (80-1934).
86. After the lower court's decision was handed down, a panel of the Fifth Cir-
cuit granted the State's motion to stay the injunction without opinion. Justice
Powell, Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit, subsequently vacated the stay. Cer-
tain Named and Unnamed Noncitizen Children and Their Parents v. Texas, 101 S.
Ct. 12 (1980). After the stay was vacated, the Fifth Circuit summarily affirmed the
district court in an unpublished decision. 49 U.S.LW. 3919 (U.S. June 9, 1981) (80-
1934).
87. See note 63-83 supra and accompanying text.
88. Holley v. Lavine, 529 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 954
(1976); United States v. Barbera, 514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975); Bolanos v. Kiley, 509
F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975).
89. 501 F. Supp. at 555, 564.
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burden required to justify deprivation of a fundamental right.90
The State asserted that concern for fiscal integrity is a compelling
state interest, but the court did not agree.9 ' The court also ob-
served that the State failed to demonstrate how the classification
advances the state interest of improving the quality of education
in the State of Texas. 92 As such, the court found the classification
to be unrelated to the stated objective. 93
ENmY AND EXCLUSION
In Plasencia v. Sureck,94 a permanent resident alien was ar-
rested at the border upon return from a brief visit to Mexico and
charged with attempting to smuggle aliens into the United States.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service determined in an ex-
clusion proceeding that Plasencia's return was an "entry", and
therefore she was excludable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (31).95 The
district court vacated this decision, holding that the INS could
only proceed against a permanent resident alien returning from a
brief visit abroad in deportation proceedings.96
An alien can be excluded only if his coming into the country is
a section 101(a) (13) "entry".97 As the Ninth Circuit noted on ap-
peal, the Supreme Court has held that the return of a permanent
resident alien to the United States can only amount to an "entry"
if the trip abroad was "meaningfully interruptive" of the alien's
residence in the United States.98 Among the criteria listed by the
Court which would render an interruption of residence "meaning-
ful" is if the purpose of leaving is to accomplish an end contrary
90. Id. at 582.
91. Id. The court did agree that maintaining the fiscal integrity of the schools
is a legitimate state interest.
92. Id. at 583.
93. Id.
94. 637 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1980).
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (31) (1976) excludes from admission: "[A]ny alien who
at any time shall have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted,
abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in
violation of law."
96. 637 F.2d at 1287.
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (13) (1976).
98. In Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963) the Court noted that the
length of the absence, the purpose of the trip and whether the alien had to obtain
special travel documents are among the relevant factors for determining whether
a departure is "meaningfully interruptive". See notes 234-241 infra and accompa-
nying text.
to immigration law policies.99 The INS argued that because the
Immigration Judge found Plasencia was attempting to achieve
such a contrary object, she made an "entry" and was therefore
subject to exclusion proceedings. Because deportation proceed-
ings provide important procedural protections not available in ex-
clusion proceedings, the court disagreed with the Service's
characterization of the issue. In the court's view, the question
was whether Plasencia was entitled to have the determinations of
"entry" and excludability made in a deportation proceeding.OO
Citing the Supreme Court in Kwong Hai Chew v. INS101 and its
own decision in Maldonado-Sandoval v. INS,102 the Ninth Circuit
stated that the procedural protections that a permanent resident
alien otherwise enjoys cannot be lost simply by making a brief
trip abroad.103 To allow the Service to circumvent the require-
ments of a deportation proceeding because the alien had made
such a trip would be "manifestly unfair".104 The court also distin-
guished its decision in Palatian v. INS,105 which the INS argued
allows the Service to determine whether the return of a perma-
nent resident alien amounted to an "entry" in an exclusion pro-
ceeding. 0 6 Because Palatian was convicted of smuggling drugs
prior to the commencement of exclusion proceedings, the factual
basis for his exclusion was litigated in a criminal proceeding
which guaranteed Palatian the full array of procedural rights.
The court felt that unlike Plasencia, Palatian was not prejudiced
by the use of exclusion proceedings. 07 As a result, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that when a permanent resident alien is returning from
a trip abroad, and the issue is whether the return is an "entry",
the question must be litigated in a deportation proceeding. 08
The District Court for the District of Kansas faced the problem
of indeterminate detention of excludable aliens awaiting deporta-
tion. In Fernandez v. Wilkinson,109 the petitioner for a writ of
habeas corpus contended that the continued confinement without
bail of an excludable refugee violates the fifth amendment due
process clause and the eighth amendment proscription of cruel
and unusual punishment. The petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, was
99. 374 U.S. at 462.
100. 637 F.2d at 1288.
101. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
102. 518 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1975).
103. 637 F.2d at 1288.
104. Id. at 1289.
105. 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974).
106. 637 F.2d at 1289.
107. Id.
108. ICL
109. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
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among 130,000 Cubans who immigrated to the United States by
boat in 1980. He admitted in a primary interview with the INS
that he had been imprisoned in Cuba for theft and attempted bur-
glary convictions. An examining officer concluded that the peti-
tioner should be detained pending an exclusion hearing. The
petitioner was transferred to the United States Penitentiary at
Leavenworth, Kansas, a maximum security institution. An immi-
gration judge concluded during the exclusion hearing that the pe-
titioner was excludable and ordered him deported. Due to the
failure of Cuba to respond to diplomatic efforts by the INS to ar-
range the return of the petitioner and others, the Government
could not carry out the deportation order. As a result, the peti-
tioner faced indefinite confinement in a maximum security prison
without being charged with or convicted of a crime."10
The district court recognized the settled doctrine that nonen-
trants do not enjoy the full panoply of rights guaranteed to citi-
zens and alien entrants by the Constitution."' A legal fiction
characterizes excluded and excludable aliens like the petitioner
as not having entered the United States. The court rejected the
argument that the force of the fiction diminishes as the duration
of the imprisonment increases.112 The court could find no author-
ity for the employment of indeterminate detention by the Service,
and concluded that its application amounted to an abuse of dis-
cretion." 3 Nevertheless, the court held that neither the Constitu-
tion nor any statute provides protection from this wrong.114
Turning to international law, however, the court found that such
arbitrary detention violates fundamental principles of human jus-
tice,"15 and as such, can be judicially remedied. The court held
that when an excluded alien is placed in a maximum security
110. Id. at 788-89.
111. Id. at 790. See also Fallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
112. 505 F. Supp. at 790.
113. Id. at 792-95.
114. Id. at 795. Pending publication of this Synopsis, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court in Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654
F.2d 1382 (1981). The majority concluded that the continued indefinite detention of
Fernandez violated not only international principles of fairness but also the statu-
tory scheme of the INA and the Constitution. Id. at 1389-90.
115. Id. The court cited The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/801 (1948), and The American Convention of Human Rights, 77 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 28 (July 4, 1977), for authority that international law guarantees the right to
be free of arbitrary detention.
prison pending actual deportation, that alien may only be placed
in such a facility for a determinate period. In addition, the alien
must be informed of the maximum length of his detention upon
commencement of the term.n6 The court ordered the termination
of the petitioner's confinement within 90 days, and suggested a
number of ways by which the Service could comply. The peti-
tioner could be deported, or released on parole under specified
conditions. The Service could move the petitioner to a refugee
camp, or a procedurally-adequate hearing could be held to deter-
mine whether further detention of the petitioner would be neces-
sary because he is likely to abscond, or because he is a threat to
security or to the citizens of the country."7
SECTION 212(c)
Section 212(c) of the INA118 grants to the Attorney General the
discretion to waive certain grounds of inadmissibility for perma-
nent resident aliens who have temporarily traveled abroad and
are returning to a lawful domicile unrelinquished for seven con-
secutive years. In Tapia-Acuna v. INS,n9 the Ninth Circuit
changed its position on the availability of relief under section
212(c) in deportation cases. The court concluded that such relief
can be sought in drug-related cases, and can be granted to an
alien who has not departed from and returned to the United
States.
Tapia-Acuna, a lawfully admitted permanent resident, was con-
victed of a drug-related offense in an Arizona state court. In de-
portation proceedings, an immigration judge found the petitioner
deportable under section 241(a) (11) 120 of the Act, and denied his
request for section 212(c) relief.121 After an Arizona state court
expunged the conviction, Tapia-Acuna moved that the BIA reopen
and reconsider his request. The Board denied the motion for two
reasons: expungement did not eliminate the conviction for sec-
tion 241(a) (11) purposes; and in the Ninth Circuit section 212(c)
116. 505 F. Supp. at 800.
117. Id.
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976) provides:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily pro-
ceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who
are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive
years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without
regard to the provisions of paragraph (1) through (25) and paragraphs
(30) and (31) of subsection (a).
Section 1182(a) describes several classes of aliens excluded from admission.
119. 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981).
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1976).
121. 640 F.2d at 223.
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relief is not available to an alien deportable under section
241(a) (11).122 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA decision in an
unpublished memorandum. 1 23 Tapia-Acuna petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court granted the petition in a
summary order124 which also vacated the judgment and re-
manded for reconsideration in light of the Government's assertion
that it was no longer opposed to the availability of section 212(c)
relief in drug-related deportation cases.125
On remand, the Ninth Circuit observed that while section
212(c) by its language refers only to the admission of aliens sub-
ject to exclusion, the provision has long been available in deporta-
tion proceedings.126 The Ninth Circuit in Aria-s-Uribe v. INS,127
however, had concluded that an alien deportable under section
241(a) (11)128 was ineligible for section 212(c) relief. In reversing
this position, the court followed the Second Circuit's decision in
Francis v. INS,129 which held that this interpretation of the scope
of section 212(c) violates due process. An alien convicted of a
drug-related offense who leaves the country temporarily is eligi-
ble for section 212(c) relief upon return. Under Arias-Uribe, how-
ever, a similarly situated alien who remains in the country would
be ineligible.130 The Second Circuit could find no rational basis
for this distinction, and held in Francis that it was unconstitu-
tional to deny eligibility for section 212(c) relief to aliens deport-
able under section 241(a) (11) who had not departed from the
United States since their drug convictions.131 The Ninth Circuit
agreed that the Arias-Uribe interpretation of section 212(c) cre-
ated a distinction without a rational basis, and adopted the Fran-
cis holding.
In Chiravacharadhikul v. INS,132 the Fourth Circuit held that in
order to qualify for section 212(c) relief, an alien must accumulate
the seven year period of unrelinquished lawful domicile after pro-
122. Id. at 224.
123. 620 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 344 (1981).
124. 101 S. Ct. 344 (1981).
125. 640 F.2d at 224.
126. Id.
127. 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972).
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (11) (1976).
129. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
130. 640 F.2d at 224.
131. 532 F.2d at 271-73.
132. 645 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1981).
curing permanent resident status. The petitioner was convicted
of unlawfully distributing a controlled substance and subse-
quently ordered deported. At the time of the conviction, the peti-
tioner had lived in the United States continuously for more than
seven years. His request for section 212(c) relief was denied,
however, because the statutory period had not accrued after he
obtained permanent resident status in 1977.133
The Fourth Circuit relied on interpretations of the domicile re-
quirement by the INS134 and the Ninth Circuit 35 to uphold the
denial of relief. The court noted that for over twenty years the
Service has interpreted section 212(c) to require residence in the
country for seven years after acquiring permanent resident sta-
tus. 136 In addition, the court cited the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Castillo-Felix v. INS,137 which adopted the INS view of the statu-
tory period of section 212(c). Because the Second Circuit rejected
this view in Lok v. INS,138 a serious split now exists among the
circuits about how to calculate the period of unrelinquished law-
ful domicile for the purposes of section 212(c).
The BIA ruled in In re Lok'39 that lawfulness of the section
212(c) period of unrelinquished domicile ends when the alien has
been found to be deportable by an immigration judge. The period
will continue only if a timely appeal is filed, and then only until
the deportation order is affirmed. Once terminated, the lawful-
ness of the domicile cannot be revived by a motion to reopen or
reconsider or by an action for judicial review unless the reviewing
court reverses the decision to deport.
DEPORTATION PROCEDURE
Five significant cases have been decided which further define
the procedural aspects of deportation.140 In Obitz v. INS, 141 the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the INS is not required to reopen a de-
portation hearing when an alien subject to deportation estab-
lishes eligibility for adjustment of status. Obitz, who had entered
the country in 1970, admitted in deportation proceedings in 1971
that she was subject to deportation. While under a final order to
133. Id. at 249.
134. Id. at 250. See In re Newton, LD. No. 2733 (1979).
135. Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979).
136. 645 F.2d at 250.
137. 601 F.2d at 465.
138. 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
139. LD. No. 2878 (1981).
140. Iran v. INS, 656 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1981); Daneshvar v. Chauvin, 644 F.2d
1248 (8th Cir. 1981); Oloteo v. INS, 643 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981); Tejeda-Mata v. INS,
626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980); Obitz v. INS, 623 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1980).
141. 623 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1980).
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depart the country by March 18, 1977, Obitz married a United
States citizen. After the Immigration Service approved her hus-
band's visa petition to accord Obitz immediate relative status, she
moved to reopen her deportation hearing. In the motion, Obitz al-
leged that approval by the Service of the visa petition made her
statutorily eligible for adjustment of status. 42
In reviewing the denial of Obitz's request by the BIA, the Ninth
Circuit disagreed with Obitz on the applicability of Wang v.
INS143 and Urbano de Malaluan v. INS144 to the facts of her
case.145 The court observed that while eligibility for suspension of
deportation involves a discretionary determination, eligibility for
adjustment of status does not.'4 In Malaluan and Wang, the
Ninth Circuit stated that such a discretionary determination of
statutory eligibility for suspension of deportation would be diffi-
cult without a hearing.147 ' Because the Service admitted Obitz's
eligibility for adjustment of status, the court found no need to reo-
pen the deportation hearing.148
In Tejeda-Mata v. INS,149 the Ninth Circuit recognized the im-
portance of providing an interpreter to an alien who cannot speak
fluent English, when that alien is entitled to a full and fair hearing
prior to deportation. The court found error in the Immigration
Judge's denial of Tejeda-Mata's request for translation of the tes-
timony of the government's only witness. Nevertheless, the court
held that the error was harmless.150
During the deportation hearing, Tejeda-Mata testified through
an interpreter. On cross-examination he admitted telling an im-
migration officer prior to his arrest that he came from Mexico.
When that officer testified (in English), Tejeda-Mata's counsel re-
quested that the officer's testimony be translated for Tejeda-Mata
by the official interpreter. The immigration judge refused this re-
142. Id. at 1332.
143. 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd per curiam, 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
144. 577 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1978).
145. 623 F.2d at 1332-33.
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1) (1976) requires that the Attorney General find ex-
treme hardship will result from deportation in order to establish statutory eligibil-
ity for suspension of deportation. See notes 214-233 infra and accompanying text.
Eligibility for adjustment of status turns on compliance with the fixed standards of
8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976).
147. 623 F.2d at 1333.
148. Id.
149. 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980).
150. Id. at 726-27.
quest, and also counsel's offer to translate the testimony him-
self.151 The petitioner-alien appealed, alleging that these refusals
constituted a denial of due process.
Because deportation is viewed as a civil proceeding, the Ninth
Circuit stated that an alien subject to deportation is not entitled
to the full panoply of due process protections accorded to a crimi-
nal defendant.152 When charged with illegal entry, however, an
alien is entitled to a full and fair hearing on the issue of deporta-
tion.15 3 When the alien cannot speak English fluently, considera-
tions of fundamental fairness require that an interpreter be
provided.154 Thus, the court felt that because an official inter-
preter was present, and the petitoner's counsel offered to inter-
pret, the immigration judge's denial of the request for translation
was an abuse of discretion.155 Nevertheless, the court held that
the error was harmless because the untranslated testimony only
confirmed Tejeda-Mata's admission of alienage. A new hearing,
therefore, would serve no purpose.156
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Daneshvar v. Chau-
vin,157 ruled that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a
final order of deportation in a habeas corpus proceeding. An im-
migration judge had ordered Daneshvar's deportation, but permit-
ted him to leave the country voluntarily.158 Rather than leave
within the time allowed, Daneshvar filed a motion to reopen the
deportation proceeding. While the motion was pending,
Daneshvar was arrested and jailed pursuant to the deportation or-
der.159 The alien then petitioned the district court for a writ of
151. Id. at 723.
152. Id. at 726. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 237 (1960); Whetstone v. INS,
561 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1977).
153. 626 F.2d at 726. Wong Yang Song v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-51 (1950); Gar-
cia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
154. See Ramirez v. INS, 550 F.2d 560, 565 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977); Leung v. INS, 531
F.2d 166, 168 (3d Cir. 1976); Orozco-Rangel v. INS, 528 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1976);
Niarchos v. INS, 393 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1968); Haidar v. Coomey, 401 F. Supp.
717, 720 (D. Mass. 1974).
155. 626 F.2d at 726.
156. Id. at 727. This case has been rescheduled for rehearing en banc. 58 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 608 (1981). The decision to reschedule was perhaps influenced
by the strong dissent of Judge Ferguson. The dissent viewed an alien's right to
understand the proceedings against him as a basic constitutional right. Judge Fer-
guson felt that since presence is meaningless without comprehension, a violation
of this right could never be characterized as harmless error.
157. 644 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1981).
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1976) provides that an alien under deportation proceed-
ings be permitted: "to depart voluntarily from the United States at his own ex-
pense in lieu of deportation if such alien shall establish... that he is, and has
been, a person of good moral character for at least five years immediately preced-
ing his application for voluntary departure under this subsection."
159. 644 F.2d at 1248-49.
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habeas corpus, claiming the final order of deportation deprived
him of liberty without due process.16o The district court held that
its habeas corpus jurisdiction was limited161 and that only the
courts of appeals could review the final order of deportation.
In determining the scope of the district court's habeas corpus
jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit considered a question of statutory
interpretation. Section 279 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952162 grants jurisdiction to the district courts in all civil and
criminal cases arising under the immigration title of the Act.163 In
1961, however, section 106(a) 164 was added to the Act. Section
106(a) provides that the "sole and exclusive" procedure for judi-
cial review of a final order of deportation is the petition for review
in a court of appeals. The Eighth Circuit cited the United States
Supreme Court decision in Foti v. INS165 as authority for re-
jecting Daneshvar's contention that section 279 was the applicable
provision. The Supreme Court in Foti noted that by enacting sec-
tion 106(a), Congress intended to prevent dilatory tactics by elim-
inating the first step in the process of judicial review.166
The Eighth Circuit then addressed Daneshvar's argument that
section 106(a) (9)167 excepted habeas corpus proceedings from the
general rule of appellate court exclusivity. While the court agreed
that the section, on its face, would support that interpretation, the
court refused to adopt it. The court felt that to read section
106(a) (9) as Daneshvar urged would result in the exception swal-
lowing the rule. "Custody" in the habeas corpus context includes
the restriction of movement resulting from any final order of de-
portation. If the view that section 106(a) only applies to those not
in custody were adopted, the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
160. Id. at 1249. Daneshvar based this claim, among other reasons, on his in-
ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him because he did not
speak fluent English.
161. Id. The district court concluded that under its habeas corpus jurisdiction
it could only review ancillary or preliminary actions of the INS.
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1976) provides: 'The district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the
provisions of this subchapter."
163. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1363 (1976).
164. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1976).
165. 365 U.S. 217 (1963).
166. Id. at 230.
167. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (9) (1976) provides: "(a) any alien held in custody pur-
suant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review thereof by habeas
corpus proceedings."
of appeals would be eliminated. The court found instead that the
exception of section 106(a) (9) should be limited to review of the
denial of discretionary relief where the deportability of the alien
is not in question.168
Section 246(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act169 im-
poses a five-year statute of limitations on rescission of permanent
residence achieved by adjustment of status. In Oloteo v. INS,170
the issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether section 246(a) ap-
plies to deportation proceedings brought on the ground of ineligi-
bility at the time permanent resident status was obtained. Oloteo
was admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 1969 on the basis
of his claimed status as an unmarried child of a permanent resi-
dent. Oloteo's wife, by a marriage allegedly occurring after his
entry, was later granted preference status and admitted as a per-
manent resident. More than five years after the entry of Oloteo's
wife, the immigration service discovered that the couple had been
married prior to Oloteo's entry.171 The Oloteos claimed that the
subsequent deportation proceedings' 72 were barred by section
246.173
The court refused to extend the statute of limitations on rescis-
sion of adjustment of status proceedings to deportation proceed-
ings. There is a clear distinction between the two, and the court
found the statutory language to be a clear indication that section
246(a) applies only to the rescission of adjusted status. 7 4 The
Oloteos argued that Congress intended the time-bar to apply to
deportation proceedings against adjusted status aliens brought on
the ground of ineligibility at the time adjusted status was
granted.175 Because this would provide the benefit of a limitation
on deportation to adjusted status aliens that is not available to
immigrating aliens, the Oloteos would be denied the equal protec-
168. 644 F.2d at 1250-51.
169. 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (1976).
170. 643 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1981).
171. Id. at 680.
172. This misrepresentation was grounds for deportation under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1) (1976) because the Oloteos' entry visas had been obtained by fraud,
contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(19) (1976).
173. 643 F.2d at 680.
174. Id. at 682. 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) provides in part: "[A]t any time within five
years after the status of a person has been otherwise adjusted under the provi-
sions of section 1255 ... the Attorney General shall rescind the action taken
175. This argument was also recently rejected in an administrative decision. In
In re Belenzo, I.D. No. 2793 (1981), the Attorney General ruled that the five-year
time-bar of § 246 does not bar deportation proceedings against adjusted aliens,
even where the asserted grounds for deportation are acts committed in procuring
the adjustment. For a more comprehensive discussion of this decision, see 58 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 360-62 (1981).
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tion of the laws. 17 6 Without reaching the constitutional question,
the Ninth Circuit rejected the suggestion that Congress intended
section 246(a) to apply in any way to deportation proceedings.' 17
Beyond the clear language of the statute, the court noted that
Congress had expressly done away with periods of limitation dur-
ing which deportation proceedings may be commenced.178 In ad-
dition, the court relied on an administrative ruling of the Attorney
General that section 246(a) did not bar exclusion or deportation
proceedings commenced more than five years after adjustment of
status.179
In Iran v. INS,180 the Ninth Circuit held that the presumption of
illegal entry in 8 U.S.C. § 1361181 must be read to apply only in de-
portation proceedings involving illegal entry. The petitioner en-
tered the United States as a non-immigrant visitor authorized to
remain for 6 months, but remained beyond that period.182 The
court observed that in a deportation proceeding, the INS has the
burden of proving the subject's deportability by "clear, unequivo-
cal and convincing evidence."183 Proof of deportability involves
two steps. The INS must show that the subject of the proceeding
is an alien, and then that the subject is deportable under the Im-
migration and Nationality Act.184 In cases involving illegal entry,
once the INS proves the subject's alienage, the presumption of il-
legal entry applies. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 places on the subject of the
proceeding the burden of providing the "time, place and manner
of his entry."185 If the subject fails to meet this burden, as did
Iran,18 6 he is presumed to be in the United States illegally and the
176. 643 F.2d at 682.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 683 n.7.
179. In re S, 9 1 & N Dec. 548 (1962).
180. 656 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1981).
181. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) provides in part
In any deportation proceeding under chapter 5 against any person, the
burden of proof shall be upon such person to show the time, place, and
manner of his entry into the United States. ... If such burden of proof is
not sustained, such person shall be presumed to be in the United States in
violation of law.
182. 656 F.2d at 470.
183. Id. at 471. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966); 8 C.F.RL 242.14(a) (1981).
184. 656 F.2d at 471.
185. Id.
186. The subject in this case failed to introduce any evidence at his deportation
hearing.
INS will have met its burden of proving deportability.187
The Ninth Circuit noted that while section 1361 applies to "any
deportation proceeding," several reasons required that the section
be limited to those cases involving illegal entry.188 First, there is
no reason to require proof on the issue in cases not involving ille-
gal entry. Second, section 1361 was enacted as a procedural rule;
if it was applied in all deportation cases, it would provide a source
of substantive law in cases that do not involve illegal entry.
Third, to apply section 1361 when illegal entry is not an element
of the charge of deportability would offend due process. 89 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that section 1361 must be interpreted
to apply only in those cases where illegal entry is at issue.19 0
SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION
In addition to the Supreme Court opinion in INS v. Wang,191
several judicial and administrative decisions have considered the
procedure for suspension of deportation. These decisions have
addressed each of the three statutory requirements of section
244(a) 192 which the alien must meet in order to be eligible for sus-
pension of deportation.193 Once an alien establishes statutory eli-
gibility, the Attorney General has discretion to suspend the
deportation. 94 A discretionary grant is then subject to veto by ei-
ther house of Congress. 95 A major decision, which will be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court, held that the legislative veto
violates the separation of powers doctrine. 96
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Whetstone v. INS, 561 F.2d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 1977).
190. 656 F.2d at 472.
191. 450 U.S. 139 (1981). See notes 42-54 supra and accompanying text.
192. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976).
193. Id. § 1254(a) (1) extends eligibility for suspension of deportation to a de-
portable alien who:
has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period
of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such appli-
cation, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of
good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or
to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence ....
194. Id. § 1254(a). Vaughn v. INS, 643 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1981), discusses the na-
ture of this discretion.
195. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2).
196. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3211
(U.S. October 6, 1981) (80-1832).
216
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Congressional Power to Veto Suspension of Deportation
In Chadha v. INS197 the Ninth Circuit ruled that section
244(c) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Actl98 is unconstitu-
tional as a violation of separation of powers. By analyzing the im-
pact of this statutory mechanism on the attainment of legislative
goals, the court found that unicameral disapproval interfered with
essential functions of the judicial and the executive branches.199
Chadha lawfully entered the United States as a nonimmigrant
student, and two years after his visa expired, a deportation hear-
ing was conducted. After conceding his deportability, Chadha
sought suspension of his deportation under section 244(a) (1).
The immigration judge found that Chadha met the statutory re-
quirements and granted his request for suspension pending con-
gressional action. After the House of Representatives
disapproved the suspension of Chadha's deportation, proceedings
were reconvened and the INS entered a final order of
deportation.2 00
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit began by noting that the separa-
tion of powers doctrine had two purposes: to prevent dangerous
concentrations of power and to promote efficient administration
of the nation.201 In light of these objectives, the court formulated
the standard of review for a violation of separation of powers.
The assumption by one of the coordinate branches of essential
powers of another branch, if that assumption is both disruptive
and unnecessary to achieve a legislative goal, would constitute a
violation of the doctrine.202
In applying the standard to section 244(c) (2), the court consid-
ered three possible purposes for the disapproval process. First,
congressional disapproval could be viewed as a corrective device
for administrative or judicial misapplications of the statute.203
The court found that by assuming this role, the legislature dis-
rupts essential functions of the judiciary in both a vertical and
horizontal sense. There is a vertical disruption between the judi-
cial branch and the alien. The legal determination an alien has
197. Id.
198. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) (1976).
199. 634 F.2d at 436.
200. Id. at 411.
201. Id. at 422-23.
202. Id. at 425.
203. Id. at 429.
obtained through the judicial process may be set aside by the leg-
islature without reason. Therefore, the alien is denied the guar-
antees of res judicata, stare decisis, and reasoned findings. In
addition, the check of the judiciary on the executive is dimin-
ished.204 There is also a horizontal disruption. The court noted
that legislative disapproval interferes with the central function of
a coordinate branch by subjecting decisions of the judiciary to re-
view by the legislature. In the court's view, this departure from
the separation of powers doctrine unnecessarily undermines the
integrity of the judicial branch. It also disrupts judicial review of
administrative decisions for abuse of discretion or error in the ap-
plication of the law.205
The second possible purpose for the legislative veto is to pro-
vide for joint administration of the suspension statute.2 06 The
Chadha court found that this role would create a horizontal dis-
ruption. The function of the executive branch is to administer
legislative enactments in a principled fashion. Through continued
administration of the statute, the executive branch develops skill
and expertise which adds stability to the administrative process.
The court observed that constant legislative interference can
thwart this stability and threaten the integrity of the executive
process. This problem becomes even more critical when intrusion
by the legislature does not lead to changes in the general guide-
lines of the underlying statute. In Chadha's case, the legislature
failed to specify any reasons for the veto which would aid the Ex-
ecutive in preventing future error. The legislative interference
was not an amendment of prior enactments, nor an attempt to
change its instructions for the administration of the statute. As a
result, the Ninth Circuit found that this horizontal interference
disrupted the "efficient administration" purpose of the separation
of powers doctrine.207
Finally, the court observed that the disapproval process could
be viewed as the legislative exercise of a residual article I power
to further define substantive legal rights. This exercise would fall
short of statutory amendment, and the disapproval, as a separate
legislative procedure, would operate only after administrative and
judicial functions have been completed.208 In order to support the
unicameral character of this process, Congress could point to the
broad power it is granted to "make all laws" by article I of the
204. Id. at 430-31.
205. Id. at 431.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 432.
208. Id. at 433.
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Constitution.209
After discussing the importance of the internal check of bicam-
eralism, the court rejected, for three reasons, the argument that
article I authorizes the statutory disapproval procedure. First, the
court rejected the contention that because one house of Congress
can withhold discretionary relief by failing to enact a private bill,
one house can also exercise this power after the Executive or Ju-
diciary has already performed its delegated functions. With a pri-
vate bill,' Congress has full administrative responsibility. The
court concluded that the power to "make all laws" does not in-
clude the authority to revise particular administrative decisions,
since the exercise involves an unnecessary disruption of the other
two coordinate branches. 210 Second, the Ninth Circuit expressed
the belief that power to make positive law which alters the rights
of individuals must be exercised by the House of Representatives
and the Senate concurrently.2 11 Third, the court noted the poten-
tial for discriminatory treatment of certain individual aliens
through improper use of the disapproval process. 2 12
In summary, the Ninth Circuit held section 244(c) (2) to be un-
constitutional because the disapproval mechanism violates both
purposes of the separation of powers doctrine, and disrupts es-
sential functions of both the executive and judicial branches. The
court also rejected the argument that this unicameral procedure
was a legitimate exercise of article I power by Congress. 2 13
Extreme Hardship
In three opinions written prior to the Supreme Court decision
in INS v. Wang,214 the Ninth Circuit discussed some of the factors
to be considered in determining whether a particular case satis-
fies the statutory criteria of extreme hardship. The court held in
De Reynoso v. INS215 that where the only hardship caused by de-
portation would be a decrease in the standard of living, the Board
209. U.S. CONST. art. I.
210. 634 F.2d at 434.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 435.
213. For a further analysis of the section 244(c) (2) legislative veto and the sep-
aration of powers doctrine, including a discussion of the implications of Chadha,
see Comment, Congressional Review of Suspension of Deportation, 19 SAN DIEGo
L. REV. 177 (1981).
214. 450 U.S. 139 (1981).
215. 627 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1980).
of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying re-
lief. In Carnalla-Munoz v. INS,216 the Ninth Circuit considered
several factors217 presented by the petitioners. The court found
that the hardships merely reflected the adjustment required of an
alien returning to his homeland and did not constitute extreme
hardship.218 In Miramontes v. INS,219 the court reaffirmed the
principle that economic detriment alone does not establish ex-
treme hardship.
Four cases decided after Wang dealt with the extreme hardship
standard. In Perez v. INS,220 the Ninth Circuit noted that the BIA
failed to indicate the factors it considered in determining that the
petitioners had not established extreme hardship. The court
found this omission precluded even the limited judicial review
contemplated by the Supreme Court in Wang.221 The Ninth Cir-
cuit vacated and remanded the Board's decision, and held that
any future BIA decision must be based on a record prepared in
accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 103.3.222
In Santana-Figueroa v. INS,223 the Ninth Circuit distinguished
between "mere economic detriment" and inability to find any em-
ployment. The petitioner conceded deportability, but claimed
that deportation would cause him extreme hardship by severing
his ties to the community and also by rendering him completely
unable to find employment in Mexico. Both an immigration judge
and the BIA ruled that the petitioner's hardship was not extreme
because it was based primarily on economic factors.22 4
The BIA concluded that petitioner's claim amounted to "mere
economic detriment". Because deprivation of all means of earn-
ing a living can have severe personal and noneconomic conse-
quences, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BIA's
characterization of the petitioner's claim as a mere "economic"
216. 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980).
217. Id. at 1006. The petitioners suggested five factors flowing from the pro-
posed deportation which amounted to extreme hardship: (1) the difficulty in find-
ing employment in Mexico, (2) the impact of leaving the country after
establishing firm roots throughout nine years in the United States, (3) the inabil-
ity to finance their children's education in Mexico, (4) the loss of medical insur-
ance and (5) the forced sale of their home.
218. Id. at 1007.
219. 643 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1980).
220. 643 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1981).
221. Id. at 641.
222. Id. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3 (1981) provides in part: "(a) Denials and Appeals.
Whenever a formal application or petition filed under § 103.2 is denied, the appli-
cant shall be given written notice setting forth the specific reasons for such
deniaL"
223. 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
224. Id. at 1355.
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loss. 225 Since no finding was made on whether the petitioner
could find employment after being deported, the court held that
proper consideration was not given to Santana-Figueroa's claim.
Because of this abuse of discretion, the Ninth Circuit reversed
and remanded the decision of the BIA.226
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered a decision in
light of the Supreme Court's Wang opinion. Ravancho v. INS227
involved a couple whose request for suspension of deportation
was denied for failure to demonstrate that extreme hardship
would result. After their appeal of this ruling was denied by the
BIA, the Ravanchos filed a motion to reopen the deportation pro-
ceedings. In support of the motion, the couple included a psychi-
atric evaluation of their child which assessed the mental,
physical, and emotional effects of a return to the Philippines. Be-
cause the Board concluded the psychiatrist's report did not
demonstrate the necessary "extreme hardship," it refused to re-
consider its earlier denial of suspension of deportation.228
In its original decision, the Third Circuit remanded the case to
the BIA because it appeared to the court that the Board consid-
ered the psychiatric evaluation in isolation. The court concluded
that the failure of the Board to base its decision on the cumula-
tive effect of all the evidence before it was an abuse of discre-
tion.229 On rehearing, the Third Circuit observed that Wang did
not preclude all judicial review in suspension cases, since such re-
view is provided by statute. While the scope of review is limited,
it includes a determination of whether the Board exercised its
discretion in a procedurally proper manner.O This led the Third
Circuit to conclude that its original decision to remand was not
foreclosed by Wang.23 1
In Mefia-Carrillo v. INS,232 the Ninth Circuit indicated that in
order to properly exercise its discretion in the determination of
extreme hardship, the BIA must fully consider all relevant facts.
Although economic loss cannot alone establish statutory eligibil-
ity for suspension, it is still a factor to be considered. In addition,
225. Id. at 1356.
226. Id. at 1357.
227. 658 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1981).
228. Id. at 172.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 176.
231. Id. at 170.
232. 656 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1981).
the court stated that the Board must consider any personal or
noneconomic hardship which naturally flows from economic loss,
including lost educational opportunities, decreased health care,
and material welfare. The Ninth Circuit held that the Board had
failed to properly consider these non-economic factors in the peti-
tioner's case, and remanded for reconsideration. 233
Continuity of Physical Presence
In addition to demonstrating extreme hardship, a deportable
alien must also prove continuous physical presence in the United
States for seven years immediately preceding the request for re-
lief.234 The Ninth Circuit, in Gallardo v. INS,235 instructed the
BIA to apply the recently developed "meaningfully interruptive"
standard236 to determine whether an alien's departure from the
country broke the continuity requirement. In the Ninth Circuit,
an absence will not be considered to interrupt the period of physi-
cal presence if the hardship of deportation would be equally se-
vere to the alien had there been no absence.237 Gallardo had
been present in the United States for 15 years prior to her appli-
cation for suspension except for a three and one-half month vaca-
tion in 1973. On return from this vacation, she obtained a permit
to reenter the country by claiming that she intended to remain
only a few days. The court stated that this pretextual entry,
standing alone, should not break the period of physical pres-
ence.238 The Ninth Circuit based this conclusion on prior hold-
ings that not every violation of law taints an otherwise innocent
absence from the country.239
In In re Herrera,240 however, the BIA held that where the pur-
pose of a trip abroad is neither casual nor innocent it constitutes
a break in continuous physical presence. The BIA found that
Herrera entered into a sham marriage solely for immigration pur-
poses. In furtherance of this scheme, he left the country in order
to apply for an immigrant visa as the spouse of a lawful perma-
nent resident. The Board upheld the immigration judge's deter-
233. Id. at 522-23.
234. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976). See note 193 supra.
235. 624 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980).
236. Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1979); Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597
F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979). For a detailed discussion of these decisions, see Synop-
sis, Significant Developments in the Immigration Laws of the United States 1979-
1980, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 107-141 (1980). For further discussion of the "meaning-
fully interruptive" standard, see notes 97-108 supra and accompanying text.
237. 597 F.2d at 1257.
238. 624 F.2d at 87.
239. Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1966).
240. I3). No. 2853 (1981).
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mination that continuity had been broken, basing its affirmance
on the strong policy of preventing sham marriages.241
Good Moral Character
In an unpublished decision, In re Ramirez,242 the BIA clarified
the section 244(a) (1)243 requirement that an applicant for suspen-
sion be of good moral character. An immigration judge denied
Ramirez both suspension of deportation and voluntary departure
on the ground that she had failed to demonstrate her good moral
character. Factors relied on by the judge to reach the conclusion
were Ramirez's failure to report her changes of address to the
INS, her false claim of United States citizenship in order to obtain
employment, her failure to file any income tax returns, and her
claim on an employment application of four dependents when she
was only entitled to claim three. In reversing, the Board observed
that to prove good moral character, one need not show moral ex-
cellence. The circumstances relied on by the judge did not, in the
Board's view, establish that Ramirez had a depraved or calloused
conscience.
The BIA also addressed the issue of adultery, as Ramirez had
lived with a married man. Section 101(f) (2) of the INA244 bars
someone who has committed adultery from proving good moral
character. Because the case arose in the Third Circuit, the Board
applied that circuit's rule regarding "adultery" as developed in
Brea-Garcia v. INS.245 The rule requires that section 101(f) (2)
"adultery" must be defined according to state law. The Board re-
manded the Ramirez case for a determination of whether her acts
constituted adultery under Delaware law.
Discretion to Deny Relief
Even if an alien establishes, his statutory eligibility for suspen-
sion of deportation, the decision to grant the requested relief is
still discretionary.24 6 The First Circuit Court of Appeals, in
241. Id. at 6-7.
242. File A21 675 716. For a discussion of the decision, see 58 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 221-223 (1981).
243. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1) (1976). See note 193 supra.
244. Id. § 1101(f) (2).
245. 531 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1976).
246. See note 194 supra and accompanying text.
Vaughn v. INS,247 discussed the nature of this discretion and up-
held the decision of the immigration court. Vaughn was denied
suspension by an immigration judge who concluded that she had
not demonstrated "extreme hardship". The Board of Immigration
Appeals reversed on the ground that Vaughn's deportation would
cause extreme hardship to her children. The decision was re-
manded by the Board to the judge for a finding of whether
Vaughn, having met the statutory requirements, was entitled to a
favorable exercise of discretion. After another hearing, the immi-
gration judge concluded that Vaughn's total reliance on public
assistance, her failure to seek employment, and her refusal to de-
part the country voluntarily weighed against the exercise of dis-
cretion in her favor. The BIA affirmed this decision.248
The First Circuit rejected Vaughn's contention that the BIA
abused its discretion by denying her application for suspension.
In particular, Vaughn suggested that the Board failed to properly
consider the hardship her children would suffer if she was de-
ported. The court countered this argument by noting that the
Board's discretion to deny suspension would be meaningless if
the court required the relief to be granted automatically upon a
showing of extreme hardship.249 In concluding that under the cir-
cumstances the Board did not abuse its discretion, the court
noted two other factors supporting the denial. First, Vaughn only
satisfied the continuity requirement by abusing the privilege to
depart voluntarily. Second, the children, who Vaughn relied on to
establish extreme hardship, were born while she was illegally in
the United States. 250
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE
Any alien under deportation proceedings can request, pursuant
to section 244(e) 251 of the INA, the opportunity to voluntarily de-
part from the United States. To be eligible for this relief, an alien
must be able to leave the country immediately at his own ex-
pense. The constitutionality of this requirement was challenged
247. 643 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1981).
248. Id. at 36-37.
249. Id. at 37.
250. Id. at 38.
251. 8 U.S.C. 1254(e) (1976) provides:
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under de-
portation proceedings... to depart voluntarily from the United States at
is own expense in lieu of deportation if such alien shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General that he is, and has been, a person of
good moral character for at least five years immediately preceding his ap-
plication for voluntary departure under this subsection.
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in U.S. v. Barajas-Guilen.2 2 Barajas-Guillen was found deport-
able in 1977, and was offered the opportunity to apply for volun-
tary departure. Because he had no money, he was ineligible for
this discretionary relief.2 5 3 After being deported, Barajas-Guilen
reentered the country illegally. He was subsequently arrested
and convicted for reentry without permission after deportation.25 4
The defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that his
prior deportation was unconstitutional. He claimed that the sec-
tion 244(e) violated the equal protection clause of the fifth amend-
ment by discriminating against two different classes of aliens.25 5
First, by granting voluntary departure only to those aliens who
can afford it, the statute unconstitutionally discriminates against
indigent aliens. Second, 244(e) discriminates against indigent
aliens who are "under deportation proceedings" in favor of aliens
who depart prior to such proceedings.25 6 Section 242(b) of the
Act25 7 grants the Attorney General the discretion to waive depor-
tation proceedings for any alien and grant voluntary departure at
the government's expense.
The Ninth Circuit responded to the claim that these classifica-
tions were unconstitutional by holding that strict judicial scrutiny
was inappropriate. 25 8 In Castillo-Felix v. INS259 the Ninth Circuit
had previously held that the interest of a resident alien in perma-
nently remaining in the country is not a "fundamental right". Be-
cause the interest asserted by the defendant was less than that of
252. 632 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1980).
253. Id. at 750.
254. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976) states:
Any alien who-
(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported and
thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United
States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the
United States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous
territory the Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien's
reapplying for admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously
excluded and deported, unless such alien shall establish that he was
not required to obtain such advance consent under this or any prior
Act,
shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, be punished by
imprisonment of not more than two years, or by a fine of not more than
$1,000, or both.
255. 632 F.2d at 751.
256. Id.
257. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1976).
258. 632 F.2d at 752.
259. 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979).
a permanent resident alien, the court concluded that section
244(e) did not affect a "fundamental right".26o
The Ninth Circuit also found that section 244(e) did not create a
suspect classification. A classification based on wealth is only
suspect when it absolutely deprives an individual from enjoyment
of a benefit because of his indigency.261 Under the immigration
laws an indigent alien is not absolutely deprived of the opportu-
nity to depart voluntarily. The court observed that prior to the
commencement of deportation proceedings, section 242(b) allows
an alien to seek voluntary departure at government expense.262
Since no fundamental right or suspect classification could be
found, the Ninth Circuit applied a rational relation standard of re-
view. The government stated that the classifications in sections
242(b) and 244(e) were intended to save the government money.
The court concluded that Congress could rationally decide to limit
government-paid voluntary departure to those aliens whose cases
merited dispensing with deportation proceedings. 263
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
In Pei-Chi Tien v. INS,264 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that an application for adjustment of status is not aban-
doned by giving up certified employment265 on an intermittent ba-
sis. The court also rejected the argument that when an alien
accepts unauthorized employment after applying for adjustment,
his application is no longer "filed" for purposes of section 245(c)
of the INA.266
Tien, a non-immigrant alien, filed an application in January,
1974, for adjustment of status prior to the expiration of his visi-
tor's visa. The petitioner requested a sixth preference visa267
based on his labor certification as a specialty cook. The applica-
tion was denied in September, 1976, without specifying reasons
260. 632 F.2d at 753.
261. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-40 (1973).
262. 632 F.2d at 753.
263. Id.
264. 638 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1981).
265. Applicants for third and sixth preference visas under 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)
(1976) are required by 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (14) (1976) to obtain a certification from
the Department of Labor. The Secretary of Labor must certify that there is a
shortage of workers in the United States able, willing, qualified and available to
perform the certificated labor, and that employment of the applicant will not ad-
versely affect wages and working conditions.
266. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (1976) precludes from adjustment any alien who "contin-
ues in or accepts unauthorized employment prior to filing an application for ad-
justment of status. ..."
267. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (6) (1976).
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and in December 1976, Tien resigned from his job with the restau-
rant which had obtained the certification.268 On January 1, 1977,
an amendment to section 245(c) of the INA became effective, de-
nying adjustment of status to any alien who continues in or ac-
cepts unauthorized employment prior to filing an adjustment
application.269 During 1977, the petitioner worked at a second res-
taurant and obtained another labor certification. Tien filed a sec-
ond adjustment of status application based on this new
certification, but it was denied. In 1978, the petitioner worked as a
house painter.270 At a deportation proceeding in March 1979, Tien
admitted his deportability, but requested that his 1974 adjustment
application be renewed.271 The immigration judge denied this re-
quest, and the BIA affirmed, on the ground that the petitioner had
abandoned the 1974 application and therefore had violated section
245(c) by engaging in unauthorized employment prior to filing a
new application.272
Addressing the question of abandonment, the Fifth Circuit ob-
served that an applicant for entry273 must qualify, at the time ac-
tion is taken on the application, for the preference relied on when
the application was filed.27 4 Eligibility for sixth preference re-
quires a valid labor certification.275 Both the BIA and the immi-
gration judge concluded that a labor certification is valid only so
long as the alien is actually employed with the certificated
employer.27 6
The court rejected this proposition and instead focused on the
intent of the alien and the employer. Because there was an out-
standing offer of employment which Tien was willing and able to
accept, the court found the necessary intent to maintain the valid-
ity of the certificate.277 Thus the petitioner did not abandon his
1974 adjustment application, and his request for renewal at the
268. 638 F.2d at 1325.
269. See note 3 supra.
270. 638 F.2d at 1326.
271. Id. at 1327. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a) (4) (1981) provides for renewal of a previ.
ously denied adjustment application in proceedings to determine deportability.
272. 638 F.2d at 1327.
273. A lawfully admitted non-immigrant alien who applies for adjustment of
status is regarded as an applicant for entry. See 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.7e (1981).
274. See Yui Sing Tse v. INS, 596 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1979).
275. See note 265 supra.
276. 638 F.2d at 1328.
277. Id.
deportation proceedings should not have been denied. The Fifth
Circuit also disagreed with the contention of the INS that section
245(c) (2) disqualifies from adjustment any alien who engages in
employment other than that certificated. The court found no sup-
port for this narrow construction in the statutory language or in
the legislative history.27 8
NATURALIZATION
An applicant for naturalization bears the burden of proving his
or her "good moral character".279 If the alien had been convicted
of a crime of "moral turpitude", or if the alien admits committing
such a crime or committing acts which amount to such a crime,
then the alien is ineligible for a finding of "good moral charac-
ter".280 In Nemetz v. INS281 the Fourth Circuit addressed the is-
sue of whether it is proper to look to state law to determine
"moral turpitude".
At naturalization proceedings before an INS examiner, Nemetz
admitted to having homosexual relations with his male roommate.
The examiner recommended that naturalization be denied be-
cause Nemetz failed to meet the burden of proof on the issue of
good moral character.2 82 The district court accepted this conclu-
sion, holding that Nemetz failed to rebut the inference that he
had committed a crime of moral turpitude as defined by Virginia
law. 283
The Fourth Circuit noted the competing considerations in the
278. Id. at 1329.
279. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976) states:
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be
naturalized, unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preceding the date of
filing his petition for naturalization has resided continuously, after being
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at
least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date
of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods total-
ing at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State in
which the petitioner fied the petition for at least six months, (2) has re-
sided continuously within the United States from the date of the petition
up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the periods
referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral
character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United
States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States.
See also Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S. 630 (1967) (Burden of proving
good moral character under this section is on the alien.)
280. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f) (3), 1182(a) (9) (1976).
281. 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981).
282. Id. at 435.
283. VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (Supp. 1981) prohibits the commission of sodomy. The
district court inferred that Nemetz committed sodomy from his admission that he
had sexual relations with his roommate. The Fourth Circuit did not decide
whether the inference was a proper one. 647 F.2d at 435 n.2.
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determination of good moral character for naturalization pur-
poses. While the United States Constitution mandates a "uniform
rule of naturalization," 284 Congress has traditionally deferred to
the states in matters of public morality.285 The use of laws which
vary from state to state, however, leads to inconsistent application
of the naturalization laws. The court observed that had Nemetz
lived in a state which did not prohibit private, consensual sodomy
between adults,286 the INS would not have been able to oppose
his naturalization on the ground of bad moral character. The
Fourth Circuit concluded that state law cannot be employed to
undermine a "uniform rule of naturalization." Thus whether an
applicant for naturalization is of good moral character is a ques-
tion of federal law.287
For naturalization purposes, the federal courts can properly
look to state law in the initial stage of determining whether a
crime involves moral turpitude. The Nemetz court noted that
crimes against the public are treated similarly throughout the
country. In most cases the use of state law will not disrupt the
uniformity requirement. But when private acts are in question,
the problem of widely varying legislative treatment by the states
arises. The Fourth Circuit suggested that in such cases the ap-
propriate federal standard is whether the act is harmful to the
public or merely offensive to personal morality. By barring a find-
ing of good moral character only for those acts harmful to the
public, the federal courts will be applying the naturalization laws
in a uniform fashion.288 In addition, the court could find no sup-
port for the proposition that Congress intended homosexual acts
to indicate bad moral character.289 Although the class of aliens
"afflicted with... sexual deviation" are excludable from admis-
sion into the United States,290 this class was not included by Con-
gress among the six classes which are absolute bars for a finding
284. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
285. 647 F.2d at 435.
286. The court noted that at least nine states (Illinois, Connecticut, Oregon,
Colorado, Hawaii, Delaware, Ohio, North Dakota, and California) had decriminal-
ized sodomy between adults, and in two others (New York, Pennsylvania) recent
decisions had struck down as unconstitutional state statutes prohibiting such ac-
tivity between unmarried adults. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 436.
289. Id.
290. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4) (1976).
of good moral character.291
PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE IMMIGRATION LAWS
The most significant development in immigration in the next
year may be a legislative overhaul of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act. The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy issued its final report on March 1, 1981. After analyzing the
document, the interagency Task Force on Immigration and Refu-
gee Policy reported to President Reagan. On July 30, 1981, the
President announced the administration's immigration proposals,
which wil be submitted in a legislative package to Congress.292
Three of the proposals are of major significance.
Undocumented aliens who have been in the United States since
before January 1, 1980, could apply for a new temporary status. A
"renewable term temporary resident" could seek and hold em-
ployment, and renew this status every three years. This group
would not have access to welfare, public housing, or food stamps,
but would pay Social Security. After ten years' residence, regard-
less of when temporary status was obtained, the alien could apply
for permanent resident status.293
A temporary "guest worker" program would also be established.
For a two-year trial period, Mexican citizens would be admitted
for temporary stays of up to one year. The program would have a
ceiling of 50,000 such workers per year.
To meet the problem of employment of undocumented aliens,
the administration has proposed employer sanctions. Fines of
$500 to $1,000 could be imposed on employers of at least four em-
ployees for each offense. In addition, the Justice Department
would be authorized to seek injunctions against those employers
it could establish follow a "pattern or practice" of hiring undocu-
mented aliens. The proposals, however, reject the requirement of
a national identity card to aid in enforcement of these sanctions.
Instead, the proposals provide a good faith defense for any em-
ployer who requests of the alien and examines certain specified
documents. 29 4
291. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1976), which limits the term "good moral character,"
lists only six of the 31 excludable classes of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976), and (a) (4) is
not one of them.
292. For further discussion of the proposals and a copy of the administration's
press release, see 58 INTERPRETER RELEASES 379-80, 385-90 (1981).
293. Temporary resident aliens would not be permitted to bring in spouses or
minor children under the proposal.
294. Documents which would satisfy this requirement are either documenta-
tion issued by INS or any two of the following. a birth certificate, a driver's li-
cense, a Social Security card or a Selective Service registration certificate.
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CONCLUSION
The past year has been a very active one in the field of imnigra-
tion law. The Supreme Court broadened the investigatory powers
of border patrol officers. In addition, the Court halted the liberal
trend of the lower courts' increasingly expansive definition of "ex-
treme hardship", in favor of the Attorney General's narrower
interpretation. Whether these rulings are an indication of a more
conservative view of the immigration laws may be seen in the
next term when the Court addresses the constitutionality of the
mechanism for one-house congressional disapproval of suspen-
sion of deportation. The Court will also decide whether undocu-
mented aliens are entitled to the equal protection of the laws.
A further factor to be considered in the future of immigration
policy is the current movement to reduce the size and cost of gov-
ernment. The ability of the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice to patrol the country's borders is already severely hampered,
and further budget cuts will only worsen the situation. In addi-
tion, the administration has mandated a government-wide reduc-
tion in the overall number of regulations, both those existing and
those to be promulgated. Whether this will hinder the ability of
the Service to implement its legislative mandates and to respond
to problems as they arise remains to be seen.
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